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1 The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead is a significant contribution to the recent “Mead
renaissance.” It gathers some contributions first presented at the conference celebrating
the 150th anniversary of the birth of George Herbert Mead held in April 2013 at the
University of Chicago and organized by Hans Joas, Andrew Abbott, Daniel Huebner, and
Christopher  Takacs.  The  volume  brings  scholarship  on  G. H. Mead  up  to  date
highlighting Mead’s relevance for areas of research completely ignored by past Mead’s
scholars  who  were  mainly  concentrated  on  Mead’s  contributions  to  sociological
disciplines. The volume is structured in three parts devoted to the three main areas in
which,  according  to  the  editors,  Mead’s  work  is  currently  inspiring  contemporary
scholars:  “History,  Historiography,  Historical  Sociology;”  “Nature,  Environment,
Process;” “Cognition, Conscience, Language.” The five contributions of the first part
deal  with the potential  of  Mead’s  work for fields of  historical  research and to new
historical  contextualization  of  Mead’s  thinking.  The  four  studies  on  “Nature,
Environment,  Process”  which  form  the  second  part  of  the  volume  are  devoted  to
Mead’s  relevance  for  the  history  and  philosophy  of  nature.  The  third  part  on
“Cognition,  Conscience,  Language”  is  the  largest  of  the  volume,  it  gathers  six
contributions devoted to the increasing relevance of Mead’s work for cognitive science.
2 Among the  impressive  contributions  of  the  first  part,  Camic’s  first  chapter  puts  in
lights the importance Mead gave in Movements to “research method” and the “concept
of modern science” as his first topics. Whereas in the second chapter of the volume
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Daniel Huebner deals with Mead’s relevance for the history of science. In particular,
Huebner broadly refers to Mead’s archival materials and secondary sources to shows
how Mead’s interest in the history of science was always intertwined to his pedagogical
convictions. In “Pragmatism and Historicism: Mead’s Philosophy of Temporality and
the Logic of Historiography,” the third chapter of the first part, Hans Joas explores the
similarities  between  American  pragmatism  and  German  historicism,  claiming  that
pragmatists  developed  ideas  that  allow  us  to  overcome  the  dichotomy  between
objectivism and relativism in historiography. In chapter four, Robert Westbrook shows
Mead’s contributions to the idea of democratic inclusiveness superior even to Dewey’s
views, whereas Karl-Siegbert Rehberg focuses the fifth chapter to a reevaluation of the
relationship  between  Mead  and  the  intellectual  traditions  that  include
phenomenologists  like  Max  Scheler  and  philosophical  anthropologists  like  Helmut
Plessner and Arnold Gehlen. Particularly noteworthy is Charles Camic’s first chapter,
“Changing  ‘Movements  of  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century’:  Historical  Text  and
Historical  Context,”  which focuses on Mead’s  Movements  of  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth
Century.  This  volume is  a  posthumous compilation of  notes  based on some lectures
Mead gave in 1928 in a course with the same title and subsequently edited into book
form by Merritt H. Moore. This is one of the most neglected texts by Mead’s scholars,
although, as Camic correctly argues, the circumstance that Movements is the result of
edited course stenographic notes would hardly seem enough to relegate this work to
the interpretative sideline, since the most famous Mind, Self, and Society is likewise the
result  of  edited  course  notes.  According  to  Camic,  the  reason  for  such  scholars’
reluctance to tackle Movements is mainly attributable to “the book’s seemingly small
payoff for readers interested in the fundamental Meadian topics of the self, the inter-
subjective foundations of the social self, the role of language in social interaction, and
so on […] but not concerned with considering these subjects in relation to Mead’s claim
that  human  thought  is  fundamentally  historical”  (17-8).  Camic  traces  back  to  the
lectures Dewey gave at  the University of  Michigan in 1891-2 with the same title  of
Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, and which would be transplanted at the
University of Chicago after 1894. He aims at reconstructing the genealogy of Mead’s
1915 and 1928 courses and identifying “what is historically specific about this course” (18).
He then juxtaposes the three versions, using Dewey’s 1891-2 as the “historical baseline
from which to understand how the course changed in Mead’s hands in connection with
various  contextual  changes  that  occurred”  (25).  The  most  apparent  overarching
difference  that  Camic  notes  is  that  in  both  Mead  courses  the  strongly  teleological
account  of  Dewey’s  1891-2  course  is  replaced  with  “an  account  cast  in  terms  of
historical contingency and structured in terms of the pragmatist view of history” (26).
In particular, Mead’s pragmatist premise is that progress is not toward a known goal,
rather it takes place through the appearance of problems and their solutions, the latter
deriving from the creative capacity of human agents.  In addition to this difference,
Camic points other three changes across the three versions of the lectures. The first
change is “the significantly increasing role occupied by science, as a research-based activity,
among the principal movements of modern thought” (26). While Dewey speaks about the
organized unity of intelligence which has mostly given way to specialized scientific
research (according to his Hegelian narrative structure of the time), Mead’s 1915 and
1928 lectures draw out the implications of the movement of scientific thought in the
nineteenth century by explaining that modern philosophy emphasized on method, not
on metaphysics. As he claims, “the history of science since the Renaissance is really a
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history of research process.” In this view, pragmatism is emphasized by Mead as a system
of philosophy out of the scientific method. The second change Camic suggests is “the
growing presence and increasingly positive evaluation of the Darwinian idea of evolution” (27).
Different from Dewey’s 1891-92 course Mead’s lectures are devoted to a description of
Hegelian and Darwinian ideas of evolution, but if Hegel’s views are presented in a more
critical light, those of Darwin are accepted and become in 1928 even more fundamental
to Mead’s picture. Accordingly, Darwin’s doctrine of evolution is characterized as the
principal result of the application of the proper scientific method and the guiding idea
that  modern  science  has  undertaken  in  all  investigations.  A  third  change  is  “the
declining stature of past efforts to produce knowledge of society” (28). In particular, Camic
notes that Dewey and Mead devote roughly the same proportion of lectures to past
social  thinkers,  but  while  Dewey’s  tone  is  respectful  to  the  various  earlier  social
thinkers,  Mead’s  comments,  on  the  contrary,  are  in  line  with  a  devaluation of  the
nineteenth-century social  thinkers.  He distinguishes between dogmatic theories and
modern research science and relegates most of the earlier social writings to the ash
heap of dogma. As Camic puts it: Mead’s dismissal is “his way of sweeping aside the
pseudo ‘social science’ of the past, so as to clear the ground for the genuinely social-
scientific work that is on the horizon” (30).  Strictly related to this last point Camic
addresses the question of local historical context in which Mead operated, claiming
that  the  academic  context  that  gave  voice  to  an  evolutionary  consensus  was
particularly pervasive at the University of Chicago, probably more than at any other
institution. In particular, there was the shared view among faculty members that, “the
time had arrived for the so-called social sciences to become sciences by adopting the
method of the modern research-based sciences” (33). This idea is openly expressed, for
instance,  by  Thorstein  Veblen’s  question:  “Why  is  Economics  not  an  Evolutionary
Science?” (1898), elaborated during the years he was at the University of Chicago. Now,
I find Camic’s juxtapositions of Dewey’s and Mead’s lectures useful and illuminating for
understanding the connections between the two colleagues’ approaches to the history
of thought as well as for pointing out the autonomous modifications and developments
Mead gave to the course. However, one has to take into account that such changes were
strictly related to a changing perspective occurred to Mead well before the ‘turning
point’  of  1910,  and in  particular  after  1892,  when Mead and Dewey began to  work
together on both the theory of emotions and the theory of “organic circuit.” With this
clarification in mind, it seems plausible to suppose that if Dewey had to teach again the
same course on Movements after 1894, he would have a pragmatist point of view akin to
the one Mead had in his 1915 and 1928 lectures.
3 Trevor Pearce’s “Naturalism and Despair: George Herbert Mead and Evolution in the
1880s”  opens  the  second  part  of  the  volume,  devoted  to  Mead’s  relevance  for  the
history and philosophy of nature. Pearce examines Mead’s encounter with evolution.
He argues that Mead could fully embrace the evolutionary perspective as essential to
philosophy, and not just as a gateway to agnosticism, only after he found in the work of
Josiah Royce and Hermann Lotze the “models for reconciliation of evolutionary science
and traditional notions of what it meant to be human” (133). The sociologists Bradley
H.  Berwster  and  Antony  J.  Puddephatt  devote  their  chapter  to  the  original  socio-
environmental impulse of Mead’s work, aiming at exploring the potential of Mead’s
ideas for environmental sociology. In particular, they argue that Mead’s theory of self-
development, based on his creative re-conceptualization of dualities in their continual
interdependent mutual relations, implies the possibility of a more ecological conception
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of  self.  In  continuity  with  Berwster  and  Puddephatt,  in  chapter  eight  Daniel  Cefaï
presents a detailed analysis  of  numerous dissertations of  sociologists trained at the
University of Chicago in 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, showing the theoretical complexity of
ecologies of social words. Cefaï finds in Mead’s understanding of ecology an important
counterpoint to the human ecology practiced in Chicago in 1920s which, if extended to
a  political  analysis  of  public  problems,  would  also  be  a  good  starting  point  for  a
sociology of democracy.  The last chapter of the second part is  Michael L.  Thomas’s
“Mead, Whitehead, and the Sociality of Nature.” Thomas’s contribution is devoted to
comparing Mead’s and Whitehead’s idea of reality as a temporal, constructive process,
as well as their concepts of the present, sociality, and the common world. He aims to
give the ground to new questions about the role of social sciences in creating social
change and the function of the sciences “in cultivating the creativity of action” (188).
4 The third part, “Cognition, Conscience, Language” is the largest part of the volume. It
gathers  six  contributions  devoted  to  the  increasing  relevance  of  Mead’s  work  for
cognitive science. The more recent pragmatist turn in embodied cognition has shed
light  to  pragmatists’  importance  to  the  field  of  research  that  broadly  includes
neuroscience, cognitive psychology, linguistics and it is approximating more and more
to an understanding of the social nature of mind and self. Until recent times, however,
James’s and Dewey’s works more than Mead’s work have been considered useful tools
to deal with the social nature of mind in embodied cognitive science. The contributions
gathered in the third part of “The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead” show, instead,
how more fruitful would be to reexamine the work of Mead. Most of these works are in
fact sign of a germinal attention to Mead. For instance, Ryan McVeigh’s tenth chapter
on  “Mead,  the  Theory  of  Mind,  and  the  Problem  of  Others”  pays  attention  to  the
contribution  of  Mead’s  theory  of  mind and self  to  overcome the  problem of  other
minds.  Kelvin Jay Booth’s  eleventh chapter examines some claims on imitation and
mind reading in apes,  and he shows that  there is  no clear evidence for  either and
maintaining that Mead’s theory of gestural communication offers much more plausible
and  fruitful  interpretation  of  apparent  mind  reading.  More  specifically,  in  his
impressive  contribution  Booth  argues  that  there  is  no  substantial  evidence  for  the
presence of imitation or a theory of mind in non-human primates. Nothing in research
on animal imitation shows that Mead is wrong in claiming that non-human animals do
not imitate in the sense that a  gesture itself  calls  out the same gesture in another
individual. These abilities are distinctively human. And while, contrary to Mead, “there
is strong evidence for imitation in young children that becomes the basis for taking the
attitude of role of the other,” Mead was right in arguing that this is not an imitation
instinct  but  rather  a  tendency  for  children  to  synchronize  their  movements  with
adults. According to Booth’s hypothesis, these abilities are the product of a “lack of
structure  and  an  openness  to  being  structured  by  repeating  the  actions  of  others.
Rather than instinct, it is more like a lack of instinct” (247). To explain his point of view
on the matter Booth makes use of  the idea developed by Marcel  Kinsbourne of  an
interaction synchrony between infants and adults based on human brains’ predisposition
to adopt rhythms that accord with those of others. More specifically, infants tend to
synchronize their movements with the faces and voices of caregivers. This synchrony is
based on the enjoyment of rhythm within repetition. It is particularly evident, as Booth
maintains,  in  rhythmic  music  and  in  effectiveness  of  chants  and  rituals  in  which
repetition brings structure to activity. Now, although Booth does not refer to Mead’s
embryonic  physiological  explanation  of  emotion  and  Dewey’s  behavioral  theory  of
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emotion, his hypothesis is especially noteworthy for its being in line with Mead's and
Dewey’s theory. Rhythmical aspect is in fact for both Mead and Dewey at the basis of
human actions. More specifically, according to Mead the arising of emotional tones of
consciousness  lies  in  the  physiological  reply  to  symbolic  stimuli  connected  to  the
rhythmical repetition of physiological stimulation. These stimuli have an esthetic value
expressed in war and love dances, and the instinctive acts on their basis, which call out
a vaso-motor process connected to the sensorimotor system. This explanation seems
akin to Booth’s idea that “we like rhythms and rituals” (242). It also seems useful in
favor of Booth’s proposal to see imitation as “self-imitation” as well as a repetition of
the  behavior  of  others  and  a  mutual  doing.  Furthermore,  Booth’s  referring  to  the
abilities of children to synchronize their movements with adults as a lack of instincts,
seems to be in line with Mead’s using the notion of “impulse” as distinct from instinct. 
5 In chapter twelve Frithjof Nungesser takes up a comparison of Tomasello and Mead,
focusing  on  the  transition  from  animal  to  human-specific  communication.  Behind
Nungesser’s proposal, there is a need to re-evaluate the transdisciplinary perspective of
Mead’s work overcoming the tendency of nowadays to sever the connections between
the diverse fields integrated into Mead’s arguments to the natural sciences. Thereby,
his aim is double. On the one hand, he wants to show that Tomasello’s studies “can
contribute to an empirically saturated and refined account of both the evolutionary
and ontogenetic logic of cognitive development described by Mead” (254). On the other
hand, he claims that Tomasello fails to “decouple the phylogenetic explanation of the
emergence  of  human-specific  social  cognition  and  motivation  in  situations  of
cooperation from a systematic account of the intrinsic sociality of all human action”
(267-8). The conclusion reached is that Tomasello’s conceptualization of human action
must be revised in the light of Mead’s pragmatist principles. The thirteenth chapter,
namely Joshua Daniel’s “Conscience as Ecological Participation and the Maintenance of
Moral Perplexity,” is instead devoted to Mead’s conception of self, in particular to the
I/Me distinction, and to its possible contribution to an understanding of conscience as
related to situations of moral perplexity. In his essay, Daniel argues in favor of the
maintenance of the moral perplexity related to moral problems resulting from plural,
competing interests, thus moving away from Mead’s confidence about the possibility of
the rational resolution of moral dilemmas. 
6 Particularly  noteworthy  is  Roman  Madzia’s  “Presentation  and  Re-Presentation:
Language,  Content,  and  the  Reconstruction  of  Experience.”  Madzia  aims  to
problematize the neo-pragmatists original conviction that our relation to the world is
at every instant mediated by language, so that “our primary relation to the world is the
relation of a disembodied mind to an omnipresent linguistically structured content”
(297). He does it demonstrating how Mead’s theory of symbolically constituted self and
the world, together with the currently flourishing area of situated cognition, present
“an  interesting  and  empirically  responsible alternative  to  the  increasingly  untenable
contemporary positions of  various forms of  neo-pragmatist” (297).  In particular,  he
argues that Mead “tried to think the cognition not primarily as a mental but bodily
activity. In other words, we are bodies whose ways of conduct are, among other things,
pre-structured by shareable significant practices (propositional language being just one
of them)” (312). In the last chapter, Timothy Gallagher shows how Mead’s writings fit
with the conceptual framework known as “Tinbergen’s Four Questions,” which informs
research today on the nature of human speech. Gallagher maintains that Mead fares
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well on the four issues,  going beyond them by developing a non-dualistic and non-
reductionist theory of the relationship between language and consciousness. 
7 In short, the contributions gathered in The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead testify that
Mead’s work is still informing scholarship from different fields of knowledge, from the
philosophy  of  history  to  sociology  and  social  psychology,  from  anthropology  and
ethology  to  neurosciences,  showing  that  no  sharp  lines  are  traceable  between  the
different fields of research. The three areas of scholarship in the volume provide a
detailed analysis of Mead’s importance to innovative areas of scholarship – as cognitive
science, environmental studies, social ethics, historiography, history of the natural and
social  sciences,  democratic  epistemology  and  social  ethics.  They  highlight  the
relevance of Mead’s interdisciplinary approach to the complexities of questions and
problems of language, consciousness, natural and social evolution, offering original and
unorthodox approaches to Mead, and testifying to the theoretical and methodological
contribution that his thought still provides in various fields of knowledge.
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